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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The decision represents a return to the early position that motivation
is perhaps too difficult to ascertain. The emphasis in Griffin and Go-
million v. Lightfoot was interpreted to focus on effect rather than on
motivation. Therefore, the Court held that unless pools supplied to one
group are denied to another group, the fact that closing is justified
upon unsound hypothesis is not a sufficient ground to order pools re-
opened on an integrated basis. 40 The Palmer decision retreats from the
clear implication of a growing relevance of motivation in equal pro-
tection litigation. The issue considered has potentially significant rami-
fications. 41 The decision may be interpreted to permit a locality to
"avoid by cynical default its constitutional duty to provide desegre-
gated facilities" or to practice such tactics of delay and evasion as to
render meaningless the right to desegregated use of municipal recre-
ational facilities.42
THOMAS W. WRIGHT
Securities Regulation-INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940. Moses
v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971).
Plaintiff Moses commenced a derivative action against Fidelity Fund,
Inc., two of its affiliated directors and its investment adviser., Plaintiff
complained that the affiliated directors had failed to act upon relevant
information concerning possible methods by which a portion of the
fund-paid portfolio commissions could be recaptured to reduce fund
expenses rather than to stimulate fund sales. In addition, plaintiff
alleged that affiliated directors had consistently withheld this informa-
40. Id. at 1945-46.
41. Id. at 1947 (concurring opinion).
42. Comment, supra note 37, at 1237.
1. A brief overview of the internal operations of mutual funds is outlined in Jaretzki,
Duties and Responsibilities of Directors of Mutual Funds, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
777, 780 (1964).
2. Prior to December 5, 1968 when "customer directed give-ups" were abolished on
all stock exchanges, the decision as to alternative uses of brokerage commissions on
portfolio transactions was seen as one of the major problems in the mutual fund in-
dustry. See WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MtrrUAL FUNDs
3, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87 Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); Note, The Use of Brokerage Com-
missions to Promote Mutual Fund Sales: Time to Give Up the "Give-Up," 68 Colum.
L. Rev. 334 (1968).
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tion from unaffiliated directors.3 Recovery was sought under section
36 of the Investment Company Act of 1940.4
The district court dismissed the action.5 The court of appeals re-
versed, concluding that the management defendants had breached a
fiduciary duty by intentionally pursuing a course of nondisclosure to
the unaffiliated directors in dealing with an issue involving a potential
conflict of interests.6
In litigation dealing with the liability of mutual fund directors, courts
have generally resolved the issue by first defining the type of conduct
which will impose liability7 and then finding a statutory or common
law basis upon which it may be imposed. Prior to the Investment
Company Act of 1940, which contained a statutory prohibition against
director misconduct, state courts sought to determine liability by refer-
3. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1970) provides in part that no more than 60 percent of the
directors of a registered investment company may be persons who are investment
advisers, affiliated persons of the investment adviser, or officers or employees of the
fund.
4. 15 US.C. § 8oa-35 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
(a) The Commission is authorized to bring an action in the proper dis-
trict court of the United States, or in the United States court of any ter-
ritory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, alleging
that a person serving or acting in one or more of the following capacities
has engaged within five years of the commencement of the action or is
about to engage in any act or practice constituting a breach of fiduciary
duty involving personal misconduct in respect of any registered investment
company for which such person so serves or acts-
(1) as officer, director, member of any advisory board, investment
adviser, or depositor; or
(2) as principal underwriter, if such registered company is an open-
end company, unit investment trust, or face-amount certificate com-
pany.
If such allegations are established, the court may enjoin such persons from
acting in any or all such capacities either permanently or temporarily and
award such injunctive or other relief against such person as may be reason-
able and appropriate in the circumstances, having due regard to the pro-
tection of investors and to the effectuation of the policies declared in section
80a-1 (b) of this title.
5. 316 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1970).
6. Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971).
7. Authors have assumed different positions on the issue of which field of law
should be utilized as the basis for fund director liability. See, e.g., Anderson, Rights
and Obligations in the Mutual Fund: A Source of Law, 20 VAND. L. REy. 1120 (1967);
Greene, Fiduciary Standards of Conduct Under the Investment Company Act of 1940,
28 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 266 (1959); Lobell, Rights and Responsibilities in the Mutual
Fund, 70 YAL L.J. 1258 (1961).
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ence to common law fiduciary standards applicable to directors of fi-
nancial institutions.8
Post-1940 decisions, however, have been decided by application of
specific sections of the Act,9 by examination of its legislative history,'0
and by reference to the Act's basic policy statements contained in sec-
tion 1 (b)." This section states in part that the national public interest
and the interests of investors are adversely affected when investment
companies are operated or managed in the interests of directors, offi-
cers, and advisers rather than in the interests of the company's security
holders.
The case which initially brought section 36 before the courts, Aldred
Investment Trust v. SEC,"2 examined the mutual fund industry in gen-
eral and noted the alarming potential for abuse inherent in the mutual
fund operation.' 3  The court looked at the policies of the Act con-
tained in section 1 (b) and concluded that in view of those declarations
the congressional intent was to codify the common law fiduciary obli-
gations applicable to officers and directors of investment companies.'
4
Thus the court adopted the common law fiduciary concepts and applied
them to the mutual fund industry via section 36 in order to provide
a statutory remedy for director misconduct.Y5
8. See Goodwin v. Simpson, 292 Mass. 148, 197 N.E. 628 (1935); O'Connor v. First
National Investors Corp., 163 Va. 908, 177 SE. 852 (1935); contra, Spiegel v. Beacon
Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 410-11, 8 N.E.2d 895, 904 (1937).
9. "Section 36 provides the Commission and fund shareholders with an important
instrument for challenging the more serious abuses which might occur in the mutual
fund industry. Sections 10 and 15 also impose significant duties on fund directors in
connection with the negotiation and renewal of fund advisory and underwriting con-
tracts." Eisenberg & Lehr, An Aspect of the Emerging "Federal Corporation Law":
Directorial Responsibility Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 20 RuTeGas
L. REV. 181, 183 (1966).
In addition, section 37 deals with the conversion of fund assets.
10. The legislative history of the 1940 Act is presented in North, A Brief History
of Federal Investment Company Legislation, 44 NOTRE DAME LAwvER 677 (1966).
11. 15 US.C. § 80a-1(b) (1970).
12. 151 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946).
13. "An investment company is essentially a liquid aggregation of capital consisting
of public savings turned over to the company for investment . . ." 151 F.2d at 260.
See also Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 274 F. Supp. 624 (D.D.C 1967).
14. 151 F.2d at 260.
15. Specifically the court adopted the statement in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311
(1939) that "[h]e who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve himself first and
his cestuis second . .. [hie cannot use his power for his personal advantage and to the
detriment of the stockholders . . . ." See generally Eisenberg & Phillips, Mutual Fund
Litigation-New Frontiers For The Investment Company Act, 62 CoLUM. L. REV. 73
(1962); Mundheim, Sone Thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities of Unaffiliated
Directors of Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1058 (1967).
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The scope and availability of section 36 was by no means settled
despite the paucity of litigation during the first fifteen years under the
Act. In the 1958 decision of SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc.,"6 the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided that an adviser's in-
direct sale of an investment advisory contract at an amount significantly
greater that book value was not a "gross abuse of trust" under section
36 because the Act itself had specifically provided a remedy against
such an evil in section 15 (a) (4)-the automatic termination of the
contract on assignment. Though the court did speak to the duration
of the fiduciary relationship between the fund advisor and the share-
holders, the case is of prime importance for its declaration that when
the Act provides a specific remedy for an evil, there is no need for a
section 36 action and consequently it would be hostile to the legislative
intent to assume that such a remedy would be available.'
The district court opinion in Browun v. Bullock"8 provides some per-
spective to those seeking to interpret the Act broadly. The court held
that the Act's specific grant of powers to the mutual fund management
carries with it corresponding duties of diligence. In addition, Brown
viewed section 36 as "a reservoir of fiduciary obligations imposed upon
affliated persons to prevent gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust
not otherwise specifically dealt with in the Act" e ' because at the time
the Act was passed "it was not practicable to incorporate specific deter-
rents for every potential abuse without seriously impeding the operation
of the industry."2 0 Further, section 36 was seen as the source of a
federally created substantive duty-not merely a codification of the
fiduciary duties arising under state law-which empowers the federal
courts to create a new body of law.2'
Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 22 decided contemporaneously with
Brown, reviewed the legislative history of the Act noting the over-
16. 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
17. See generally Greene, supra note 7, at 274.
18. 194 F. Supp. 207 (SD.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
19. 194 F. Supp. 238-40 n.1.
20. Id.
21. Shareholder suits alleging "gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust" under
section 36 have called upon the courts to provide meaningful standards of conduct for
directors and have resulted in the emergence of a federal common law of corporations.
See Eisenberg & Lehr, supra note 9. See also Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964); Ruder, Pitfalls in the De-
velopment of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implication Through Rule IOb-S, 59
Nw. U.L. REv. 185 (1964).
22. 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961).
1971]
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whelming support" of the mutual fund industry for its passage, and
concluded in direct conflict with Brorwn that there is no statutory
support for an implication approach to director liability.
Moses found an actionable violation of section 36 for non-disclosure
to unaffiliated directors in a possible conflict of interest situation. As
such, it is a judicial recognition that the so-called independent check
to be asserted by an unaffiliated director24 means very little unless it
is exercised after the affiliated members of management, at their own
initiative, have provided adequate information concerning potential con-
flicts of interest.25 In its approach to section 36, Moses has apparently
adopted a variation of the implication theory of liability-as Brown
implied a duty of diligence to make the delegation of a right meaning-
ful, Moses has implied a duty of disclosure to make the Act's watchdog
mechanisms effective.
MICHAEL D. HORLICK
23. To explore fully the background and motivation for the almost unanimous assent
to the Act it is necessary to consider the public image problems of the funds during
the thirties and the significant increase in public confidence which it was hoped would
result from the comprehensive regulatory provisions of the Act. See generally Greene,
supra note 7, at 266 n.2.
24. To give further meaning and to insure the effectiveness of the role played by
the unaffiliated director, the 1970 amendments to the Act have tightened the disabling
provisions by placing additional restrictions on the background of persons qualified to
assume directorial positions.
25. The specific requirement of disclosure was also treated in a 1965 SEC proceeding
wherein the Commission voiced strong approval of the policy that investors "be ac-
corded the benefits of responsible and objective observation and consideration of the
fund's activities by unaffiliated directors . . ." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 7684, (Aug. 26, 1965); Imperial Financial Servs, Inc., CCH FM. SEC. L. REP.
77, 287 at 82, 465 (Aug. 26, 1965).
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